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Purpose: We investigate the relationship between off-balance-sheet (OBS) operating leases and 
long-term debt by analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles measured by the constraints on firms in the 
financial ratios in their debt covenants. 
Design/methodology/approach: We determine debt risk profiles using three measures: the ex-
ante probability of covenant violation (Demerjian and Owens, 2016), firms in violation of debt 
covenants, and firms close to covenant violations. 
Findings: High-risk firms according to all three measures, on average, have a significantly lower 
level of operating leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a substitute for long-term 
debt. More interesting, for firms operating in industries in which leases are widely available, 
firms with a high probability of covenant violation have a significantly higher level of operating 
leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a complement to long-term debt. Further 
analysis indicates that lease financing is less costly than debt financing is for these firms. 
Research limitations/implications: Overall, our evidence indicates that firms facing financial 
constraints may attempt to lease more of their assets, but the availability of leasing is constrained 
by their debt covenant obligations and the strength of the leasing market in its industry. 
Originality/value:  We identify states in which risky firms may treat leases as either 
complements or substitutes for long-term debt, implying that the leasing decision relates to the 
availability of an active leasing market for a firm’s assets and the firm’s financial constraints. 
Our findings support recent research showing that debt and leases are complementary in the 
presence of counterparty risk providing insight into the paradoxical relationship identified in 
prior research between leases and long-term debt. 
Keywords: debt covenant, covenant violation, lease, off-balance-sheet financing, financial risk. 




Over the past twenty years, operating leases became an important source of financing for 
U.S. companies. In fact, the mean ratio of operating leases to total debt increased 745% from 
1980 to 2007 (Cornaggia et al., 2013). Some attribute this increase to the lease accounting 
standards in effect during that period (ASC 840), which allowed companies to treat long-term 
operating leases as rental agreements with no balance sheet recognition of the related assets and 
liabilities (Imhoff and Thomas, 1988; Imhoff et al., 1991; Monson, 2001). 
Regardless of this off-balance-sheet (OBS) accounting treatment, there is evidence that, 
sophisticated investors, firms, and creditors treat operating leases as debt when assessing equity 
risk and structuring loan agreements (Ely, 1995; SEC OBS Report, 2005; Yan, 2006; Paik et al., 
2015), implying that leases are a substitute for debt. However, some evidence indicates that 
operating leases provide firms with a higher level of debt capacity than secured lending, and are 
therefore particularly valued by firms facing cash flow constraints (Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995; 
Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013). This evidence is consistent with 
research suggesting that leases complement debt due to the unique characteristics of a lease, 
which provides for more direct repossession of leased assets than traditional forms of debt allow, 
and the ability to sell non-debt tax deductions (Ang and Peterson, 1984; Lewis and Schallheim, 
1992).1  
In this study, we investigate this seemingly contradictory evidence by examining the 
relationship between OBS operating leases and long-term debt by analyzing firms’ debt risk 
profiles measured by the financial ratio-based constraints placed on firms in their debt covenants. 
Given the importance of leasing in the U.S. financial market, we explore the role of debt in the 
 
1 Several prior studies investigate the “lease versus buy” decision, such as those by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and 
Rampini and Viswanathan (2013). 
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relationship between long-term debt and OBS operating leases, particularly since the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued revised guidance on accounting for leases in 2016 
(Accounting Standards Update 2016-02). This new standard, which took effect for most 
businesses in 2019, significantly changes the accounting for operating leases, requiring lessees to 
recognize the majority of their long-term operating leases on the balance sheet as right-of-use 
assets and lease liabilities, that is, long-term debt. Understanding the relationship between OBS 
leases and long-term debt provides insight into the impact of this significant accounting standard 
change.  
Debt covenants are typically set tightly enough that frequent violations are not 
necessarily associated with severe financial problems and may not result in serious penalties for 
the firm (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Whitehead, 2009; Ramsay and 
Sidhu, 1998). Further, Dichev and Skinner (2002) show that managers “take actions to avoid 
debt covenant violations” (p. 1121). Therefore, debt covenants provide a distinctive opportunity 
to examine the relationship between OBS lease financing and debt financing. We use three 
measures based on debt covenants to characterize a firm’s debt risk profile: the probability of 
covenant violation following loan inception based on Demerjian and Owens’ (2016) measure, 
actual covenant violations, and closeness (tightness) to a covenant violation in periods 
subsequent to loan inception.  
Overall, we find that firms use OBS operating leases and long-term debt as substitutes 
rather than complements. The results indicate that firms with a high probability of covenant 
violation use significantly fewer OBS operating leases. We also find that firms with covenant 
violations use OBS operating leases less frequently than do firms without covenant violations. 
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This finding is robust to the inclusion of firm size, measures of profitability, financial health, and 
firm and year-fixed effects as control variables.  
Further, using a subsample of firms that are close to a violation (i.e., firms with less than 
20% slack) produces virtually identical results to those from the violation sample. Thus, 
consistent with control-based theories (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 
1994; Roberts and Sufi, 2009), the potential transfer of control rights caused by a covenant 
violation or the fear of a violation leads to a measurable decrease in both OBS lease financing 
and long-term debt financing. This finding is consistent with the views of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC Staff Report, 2005) and results reported in prior research that 
experienced financial information users, such as creditors, consider OBS leases as a form of 
long-term debt (Paik et al., 2015).  
More importantly, we investigate firms that operate in industries that routinely use lease 
financing. Prior studies indicate that firms with viable alternative sources of financing are in a 
better bargaining position with their creditors (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). In addition, in high-lease 
industries, leasing reduces market frictions arising from transaction costs and asset selling costs 
(Gavazza, 2011), implying that firms in industries with a strong leasing market may be able to 
use operating leases as complements to long-term debt. Consistent with this supposition, we find 
that firms in high lease industries use significantly more OBS operating leases when they have a 
high ex-ante probability of covenant violation than do firms in low lease industries. This result 
indicates that financially risky firms with access to a strong leasing market finance their assets 
through leasing. However, similar to our overall findings for all industries, if they violate, or are 
close to violating, debt covenants, then their ability to lease assets is diminished. Further analysis 
shows that these high-lease industry firms have significantly higher default spreads and lower 
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credit ratings than firms with low leases do, implying that traditional debt may be a more costly 
option than lease financing for these firms. 
Overall, our findings and those in prior research imply that firms seeking financing 
options are constrained by their debt covenant obligations and the strength of the leasing market 
in its industry. These implications are consistent with prior research showing that the decision to 
lease is associated with “financial contracting costs” (Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995; Gavazza, 2011). 
That is, the cost of violating a debt covenant is such that firms will decrease their use of OBS 
leases and long-term debt. Our evidence indicates that the debt market recognizes the impact of 
leasing on firms’ financial conditions, implying that the accounting recognition of lease 
liabilities that the revised lease accounting standard (Accounting Standards Update 2016-02) 
requires aligns the financial statements with the underlying economics more fully.  
Our study empirically identifies a specific channel (debt covenants) behind the debt-
financing and OBS-lease-financing link and explores the link to specific industries. We believe 
these findings add to the literature on the complex relationship between debt financing and 
leasing, providing a possible explanation for the mixed results on whether leases are substitutes 
or complements for debt financing (Ang and Peterson, 1984; Yan, 2006; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 
2009). More importantly, by examining both the probability of covenant violations and actual 
violations, we identify states in which risky firms may treat leases as either complements or 
substitutes for long-term debt, implying that the leasing decision relates to the availability of an 
active leasing market for a firm’s assets and the firm’s financial constraints. Thus, our findings 
support recent research showing that debt and leases are complementary in the presence of 
counterparty risk; that is, the likelihood that one or more parties in a financial transaction might 
default on their contractual obligations (Ambrose et al., 2019). Overall, our findings provide 
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insight into the paradoxical relationship identified in prior research between leases and long-term 
debt and supports the balance sheet recognition of leases. 
 Section 2 discusses the background and prior research on debt covenants, including 
studies related to capital structures and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design we adopt to examine the effect of debt covenant violation on the relationship between 
OBS lease financing and debt financing. Section 4 presents the sample and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 discusses the results, and we provide the conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH  
Operating Lease Accounting Rules  
U.S. accounting standards (ASC 840) provide rules for determining whether a lease is a 
capital lease, representing asset and debt financing, or an operating lease. Under current rules, 
lease payments for operating leases represent a rental expense on the income statement with a 
footnote disclosure of the projected amount of the minimum lease payments for five years and no 
recognition of the leased asset or liability on the balance sheet. Issues related to the lease 
accounting rules, including the disparity in the lessees’ recognition of lease obligations for 
capital and operating leases, led the FASB to issue new rules in February 2016. The revised rules 
significantly change the balance sheet recognition for operating leases, requiring lessees to 
recognize a right-of-use asset and a lease liability measured as the present value of the lease 
payments over the lease term. The new rules took effect for most calendar-year businesses in 
2019, with early adoption permitted. Estimates of the impact of recognizing operating lease 
obligations on the balance sheets of U.S. public companies ranges from $1.5 trillion to $2.0 
trillion (Rapoport, 2015).  
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Prior Research on Debt Covenants 
Incomplete contract theory argues that the design of debt covenants minimizes agency 
costs by establishing the conditions under which control rights transfer to creditors (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Tirole, 2006; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Emanuel et al., 2003). Specifically, 
negotiating debt arrangements to mitigate managers’ opportunistic behavior reduces “conflicts of 
interest between borrowers and lenders” (Emanuel et al., 2003 p. 160). Common debt covenants 
are based on accounting information that creditors believe will provide them the ability to 
monitor a borrower’s financial condition and to assess their risk exposure, such as leverage, 
interest coverage, and the current ratio (Whitehead, 2009; Gârleanu and Zwiebel, 2009). Firms 
are willing to accept restrictive debt covenants as doing so reduces the cost of debt (Reisel, 2009; 
Billett et al., 2007; Bradley and Roberts, 2004).  
However, violating debt covenants is costly for firms. Firms that violate a restrictive debt 
covenant face an increased likelihood of losing control of rights through debt restructuring or 
accelerated debt payments (Nini et al., 2009; Ozelge, 2007). Not all consequences are severe, 
and some studies provides evidence that creditors frequently respond to violations by decreasing 
credit lines, increasing interest spreads, or requesting additional collateral (Roberts and Sufi, 
2009; and Chava and Roberts, 2008).  
Beyond the impact on the debt agreement itself, Roberts and Sufi (2009) conclude that 
covenant violations have a “large effect” on firms’ financing decisions, indicating that the 
violators’ net debt issuing activity experiences “large and persistent declines” immediately 
following the covenant violation. Further, both debt covenant violations and the threat of a 
violation affect firm investment (Chava and Roberts, 2008).2 Given these consequences, it is not 
 




surprising that Dichev and Skinner (2002) demonstrate that managers are motivated to avoid 
debt covenant violations.  
Supporting Dichev and Skinner’s (2002) finding that firms work to avoid debt covenant 
violations, Chava and Roberts (2008) find that when covenant slack3 falls to within 20% of a 
threshold, investment declines significantly. In addition, Beatty et al.’s (2002) study of the 
relationship between accounting changes and debt covenants concludes that to avoid debt 
covenant violations, firms are willing to accept higher interest rates to maintain the ability to 
adopt voluntary accounting changes.  
Prior studies also provide evidence that debt covenants address agency problems through 
the choice of accounting-based covenants; that is, those containing balance-sheet based ratios as 
opposed to income-statement based ratios. Balance-sheet-based ratios are less frequent in debt 
covenants for financially constrained firms than income-statement-based ratios are. This 
structuring of debt covenants aligns the needs of creditors who want to protect their interests 
with the needs of firms that want to invest in profitable ventures (Christensen and Nikolaev, 
2012). Paik et al. (2015) find that OBS operating leasing is “negatively related to balance sheet 
covenants and positively related to the use of income statement covenants,” indicating that 
creditors treat OBS operating leases as a form of debt. These prior findings suggest that debt 
contracts are written with respect to borrowing firms’ financial performance and credit risk. This 
is consistent with Dichev and Skinner’s (2002) conclusion that covenants are not “boiler plate,” 
and creditors adjust covenants to reflect the borrower’s financial characteristics. This is 
particularly pronounced in the private debt market (Ramsay and Sidhu, 1998). 
 
3 Covenant slack, default distance, and covenant tightness refer to the closeness to violation of debt covenants (El-
Gazzar, 1993; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). In this study, we use covenant slack and, 




Further, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that firms’ expected cost of equity capital measures 
influence the capitalization of OBS operating leases. Based on analyst forecasts, they show that 
the ex-ante cost of equity capital is positively associated with adjustments in the firm’s financial 
leverage (financial risk, measured as the debt-to-equity ratio) and operating leverage (operating 
risk, measured as the standard deviation of return on assets), when these leverages are adjusted 
for the capitalization of OBS operating leases.4 Supporting this work, Yan (2006) demonstrates 
that OBS leases influence the cost of debt, indicating that leasing is a substitute for debt 
financing.  
Regardless of their OBS accounting treatment, if firms and creditors treat operating 
leases as debt, then we would expect to see managers of firms with a high probability of 
covenant violations avoid taking on additional operating leases to prevent covenant violations. 
Hence, we predict that firms with a high probability of covenant violation will use OBS 
operating leases as substitutes for long-term liabilities; that is, as an alternative capital source. 
This prediction leads to the first part of our first hypothesis, where we measure the probability of 
violation following Demerjian and Owens (2016).  
H1a: Firms with a high probability of covenant violation use OBS operating 
leases significantly less than do firms with a low probability of violation.  
 
Existing studies indicate that a firm’s industry influences its capital structure and debt 
covenants (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Rauh and Sufi, 2011; Paik et al., 2015). Frank and Goyal 
(2009) conclude that a core factor determining a firm’s leverage is the industry’s median 
leverage. Rauh and Sufi (2011) include OBS leases in their analysis of capital structure and 
 
4 However, they do not find significant relationships when using ex post stock returns, defined as annual returns, as a 
proxy for the cost of capital. 
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provide strong evidence that firms in the same industry have similar capital structures, which is 
related to the similarity of their production assets. Gavazza’s (2011) results indicate that the 
secondary leasing market in the commercial aircraft industry provides an efficient mechanism for 
reallocating assets and reducing trading frictions. In an international setting, Bazley et al. (1985) 
report that voluntary lease disclosures by Australian companies are related to the firms’ industry.  
 Roberts and Sufi (2009) suggests that firms with attractive alternative sources of 
financing will not experience negative consequences when they violate their debt covenants, as 
would firms with limited access to alternative financing. This is consistent with Sharpe and 
Nguyen’s (1995) argument that the advantageous treatment of leases over other forms of secured 
debt in bankruptcy proceedings provides additional protection to the lessor, thus acting as a 
supplemental form of financing for financially constrained firms.  
Based on this research, we posit that when a borrowing firm operates in an industry in 
which leases are widely used, thereby implying the presence of a strong secondary leasing 
market, the firm may have additional financing options through OBS operating leases that are 
not available to firms in industries where leases are less common. Yan (2006) argues that firms 
decide between either debt or leases for financing by comparing the incremental cost of debt to 
the incremental cost of leasing. For firms with access to robust leasing markets, leases may 
mitigate market transaction costs, reducing the overall cost of leasing as compared to long-term 
debt.  
Lessors maintain ownership of the leased asset, allowing them to repossess assets easier 
than lenders with a secured interest in an asset. This characteristic of leases provides additional 
protection to lessen their ability to provide financing to higher-risk firms. Eisfeldt and Rampini 
(2009) thus to argue that leasing provides financially constrained firms with additional debt 
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capacity as compared to secured debt. Firms with a high probability of covenant violations face 
severe financial constraints, increasing the cost of long-term debt. Thus, firms with OBS leasing 
as an available source of financing may find leases an attractive vehicle for expanding their debt 
capacity. Given the institutional structure surrounding leases, we argue that in high-lease 
industries, a complementary effect is likely to exist between leases and long-term debt; that is, 
these firms can increase their debt capacity using OBS leases. This discussion leads to the second 
part of our first hypothesis. 
H1b:  Firms with a high probability of covenant violation that operate in high-
leasing industries use OBS operating leases significantly more than those 
with a low probability of violation do. 
 
Debt covenants provide an efficient contracting mechanism that reflects the firm’s 
environment (Emanuel et al., 2003). Debt covenants are initially tightly set; thus, covenant 
violations are common (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Gârleanu and 
Zwiebel, 2009). Gârleanu and Zwiebel (2009) attribute the tightness of initial covenants to 
informational asymmetry, in that creditors do not have the same level of information on future 
performance as do firm managers. However, when a firm violates its debt covenants, the creditor 
has more information and the right to renegotiate debt terms, including increasing interest 
spreads, demanding additional collateral, or reducing the credit capacity. If the firm does not 
have attractive alternative financing options, it may have difficulty obtaining new debt financing 
from other lenders, requiring it to accept the additional constraints (Roberts and Sufi, 2009).  
We argue that a covenant violation, as opposed to the probability of violation, 
leads to changes in the use of OBS operating leases relative to long-term debt. A firm that 
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violates its covenants crosses a legal threshold that forces it to face tighter lending 
constraints and the threat of a transfer of control rights and creditor intervention. Thus, 
we predict that firms in any industry that violate their debt covenants will have difficulty 
finding new sources of debt financing, including leases. This discussion is the basis for 
our second two-part hypothesis. 
H2a:  Firms that violate their debt covenants use OBS operating leases 
significantly less than firms that do not violate their debt covenants. 
H2b:  Firms in high-leasing industries that violate their debt covenants use OBS 
operating leases significantly less than firms that do not violate their debt 
covenants. 
 
The debt covenant hypothesis, as in Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Dichev and Skinner 
(2002), and Beatty et al. (2002), predicts that firms that are close to violating debt covenants will 
make accounting choices that help them avoid covenant violations. Thus, while these firms have 
not yet violated their debt covenants, they may alter their financing policy to avoid violations. 
Since firms use OBS operating leases as one financing source, we predict that when firms are 
very close to violating their debt covenants due to deteriorating operating and financing 
conditions, they will have difficulty finding new sources of debt financing, including leases, 
regardless of their industry. This discussion is the basis for the third two-part hypothesis.  
H3a: Firms that are very close to violating their debt covenants use OBS 
operating leases significantly less than firms that are not at risk of 
violating their covenants.  
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H3b: Firms in high-leasing industries that are very close to violating their debt 
covenants use OBS operating leases significantly less than firms that are 
not at risk of violating their covenants.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
We investigate the relationship between OBS operating leases and long-term debt by 
analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles measured as the constraints placed on firms through the 
financial ratios included in their debt covenants. We describe a firm’s risk profile as a high 
probability of violation, covenant violation, or small slack (close to covenant violation). To test 
our hypotheses, we use a sample of firms that have financial debt covenants in their loan 
agreements (we present a detailed sample description in Section 4.) For the analysis, our sample 
includes two subsamples. The first is firms that violated their debt covenants (in technical 
default). According to Roberts and Sufi (2009), about 25 percent of firms in the DealScan 
database are in technical default.  
The second subsample of firms are very close to violating their debt covenants or are 
small slack firms. To identify these firms, we use covenant slack, measured as the difference 
between the current financial ratio and the covenant threshold ratio divided by the covenant 
threshold ratio. We define firms close to violating their covenants as firms with less than 20 
percent debt covenant slack for any one of the covenant ratios included in our sample, following 
Chava and Roberts (2008).  
We adapted our base empirical model to test our hypotheses from Roberts and Sufi 
(2009): 
PROPVit   =  α0 + β1 RiskProfileit (PVIOL or VIOLATION or SMALLSLACK)it  




   where (see also Appendix.) 
 
PROPVit = Present value of OBS operating leases divided by the sum of the present 
value of OBS operating leases and long-term debt 
RiskProfileit = PVIOL, probability of covenant violation following loan inception, as in 
Demerjian and Owens (2016). We obtain PVIOL data from Demerjian’s 
web site at http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html 
             = VIOLATION, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm violates its debt 
covenants, and 0 otherwise; covenant violation occurs when a firm’s 
current financial ratios surpass the violation thresholds noted in the 
firm’s debt covenants.  
            = SMALLSLACK, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s debt covenant 
slack is less than 0.20 and 0 if the slack is greater than 0.20 
HighOBSLit = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to an industry in the 
top 50% of the distribution using the present value of OBS leases 
divided by total assets, and 0 otherwise 
Interactionit = Interaction terms of RiskProfile (PVIOL or VIOLATION or 
SMALLSLACK ) and the HighOBSL industry dummy variable 
Xit−1 = A vector of the following five control variables (β4 is a vector of five 
parameters.): 
LnMVEit-1 = Lagged natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
MTBit-1 = Lagged market-to-book ratio 
TGAit-1  = Lagged tangible assets to total assets ratio 
ROAit-1 = Lagged return on assets 
LOSSit-1 = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports loss in the prior year 
and 0 otherwise 
 
We estimate the present value of OBS operating leases consistent with the revised lease 
accounting standard (Accounting Standards Update 2016-02) by calculating the present value of 
the future minimum lease payments. We use 10% as the discount rate. Many prior studies in the 
lease accounting literature use a fixed interest rate as the present value discount rate (e.g., Imhoff 
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et al., 1991, 1993; Gritta et al., 1994; Ely, 1995; Beattie et al., 1998; Demerjian, 2011; Paik et 
al., 2015).  
 We use the PVIOL data developed by Demerjian and Owens (2016) to measure the 
probability of covenant violation across the entire set of covenants included in a loan. Their 
measure estimates the probability of covenant violation during the first quarter following loan 
inception. Their dataset covers all DealScan loan packages, with adequate information, as of 
December 2015 (Demerjian and Owens, 2016). In their analyses, Demerjian and Owens (2016) 
demonstrate that their measure of the probability of violation outperforms common alternative 
measures, concluding that their measure has significantly greater predictive ability of covenant 
violations following a loan’s inception. We obtained PVIOL data from Demerjian’s website 
(http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html). 
 The coefficients of interest are β1 and β3. β1 implies the effect of the borrowing firms’ 
risk profiles; that is, a high probability of covenant violation, covenant violation, or close to 
covenant violation, on the use of OBS operating leases (i.e., the treatment effect). We expect that 
β1 will be negative, as in hypotheses, H1a, H2a, and H3a. The sample sizes in our regression 
models vary based on the proxy for firms’ risk profiles. For the regressions using the 
independent variable PVIOL, which is the ex-ante probability of violation, and Violation, an 
indicator variable for those firms that violated their covenants, we use the entire sample of firms. 
However, for the regression using the independent variable SmallSlack, an indicator variable for 
firms within the 20% threshold of violating their covenants, we exclude firms that violated their 
debt covenants.5  
 
5 SmallSlack measures the closeness to violation. Therefore, we exclude firms that already violated their debt 
covenants from the regressions that include SmallSlack. 
16 
 
The coefficient β3 implies the incremental effect of firms in high-lease industries on the 
relationship between high probability of violation (PVIOL), covenant violation (Violation), or 
closeness to covenant violation (SmallSlack), of using OBS operating leases. We expect that β3 
will be positive, as in hypothesis H1b, which relates to a high probability of violation, while β3 
will be negative, as in hypotheses H2b, which relates to firms in violation, and H3b, which 
relates to small-slack firms. We present our predicted signs for these coefficients in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Xit−1 is a matrix of five control variables drawn from previous research showing that they 
influence covenant violation and reflect financing constraints (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). X 
includes the lagged natural logarithm of the market value of equity, the lagged market-to-book 
ratio, lagged tangible-to-total assets ratio, ROA, and an indicator variable for loss. We also 
control for firm and year fixed effects in the regressions.  
 
4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We extract our initial sample of 10,093 loan deals from Compustat and the 2013 release 
of the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database. DealScan contains data for private 
loans by bank and non-bank lenders, together with data for high-yield bonds. According to the 
LPC, most of the data covers private loans made to U.S. corporations obtained from SEC filings, 
with the remainder of the data obtained directly from participating banks in the credit industry. 
The sample covers 1996 to 2013.6  
 
6 Information on financial debt covenants is limited prior to 1996 in DealScan.  
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Kahan and Tuckman (1995) find that private loans contain relatively more financial 
covenants than public debt issues do.7 Moreover, financial covenants in private loans are tighter 
(i.e., the gap between the covenant threshold and the current accounting measure is smaller) 
compared to public debt. Therefore, we observe the most technical defaults in private debt 
issues. Accordingly, the DealScan database provides data suitable for our study on the effect of 
covenant violations on firms’ financing policies.  
DealScan provides information on many aspects of the loan (e.g., loan amount, maturity, 
interest rate, etc.), including data on financial ratio covenants. We do not restrict our sample to 
covenants containing specific financial ratios; instead, we include all ratios for which we have 
sufficient sample observations. This allows us to include the eight covenant ratios listed in Table 
2 used in the loan deals in our sample. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The sample selection process starts with obtaining all non-financial industry firms’ 
accounting and lease data from the Annual Compustat North America database. We then merge 
the DealScan debt covenant data with the lease and firm accounting data using company names 
and ticker symbols. Loans are often grouped together into deals, and financial debt covenants 
generally apply to all loans in a deal. Table 2 presents the sample of loan deals and describes the 
eight covenant ratios collected from this DealScan-Compustat merged database. Finally, we 
remove the top and the bottom one percent to eliminate the effect of outliers. This merge process 
results in 16,160 financial ratios for 10,093 deals between 1996 and 2013. We use this sample to 
test H2 and H3. To test H1 on the ex-ante probability of violation, we further merge the data with 
 
7 Bharath et al. (2008) note that private loans also contain stricter non-price terms (collateral and loan maturity) 
compared to public bonds. 
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Demerjian and Owens’ (2016) dataset to determine the PVIOL estimates. This results in a sample 
size of 10,093 deals to test H1.  
The frequency analysis by year reported in Table 2 indicates that the number of 
covenants and loan deals decreased considerably over time. In addition, the number of financial 
ratio covenants that use balance sheet information only, such as the Leverage Ratio, Debt to 
Equity, Debt to Tangible Net Worth, Current Ratio, and Quick Ratio, decreased significantly 
over time, as in Demerjian (2011), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), and Paik et al. (2015). 
Table 3 reports the characteristics of the sample firms. In our sample, the mean of the 
covenant violation variable, VIOLATION, is 0.3600, indicating that approximately 36 percent of 
the sample firms violated covenants. Likewise, the mean probability of covenant violation, 
PVIOL, is 0.3700, consistent with Demerjian and Owen’s (2016) mean of 0.373 based on their 
1984 – 2004 sample. The mean of SMALLSLACK is 0.2253, indicating that approximately 23 
percent of the sample firms have tight covenant slack, which is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (e.g., Roberts and Sufi, 2009).  
 The mean total assets (TA), total liabilities (TL), long-term debt (LTDT), market value of 
equity (MVE), and present value of operating leases (PVL) are all larger than the median values, 
indicating right-skewed distributions. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports a 
loss, and 0 otherwise. The mean LOSS is 0.2200, indicating that approximately 22 percent of the 
sample firms reported losses.  
Next, for each covenant ratio, we identify firms with and without covenant violations. 
Panel A in Table 4 compares the firm characteristics of violating and non-violating firms. We 
also compare firms with small and large covenant slack. Panel B in Table 4 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the small versus large slack firms. 
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(Insert Table 4 here) 
In columns (1), (3), and (5) in Panel A of Table 4, the mean PROPV, defined as the 
present value of OBS operating leases divided by the sum of the present value of OBS operating 
leases and long-term debt for violating firms (0.1394), is significantly smaller (p<.01) than that 
for non-violating firms (0.2824). This difference indicates that violating firms have a 
significantly smaller amount of OBS operating leases than do non-violating firms. The mean 
PROPV difference is -0.1430 in column (5). 
In addition, the violating firms are significantly smaller (p<.01) in terms of market value 
of equity (LnMVE, 6.3856 vs. 6.5067). Furthermore, violating firms are significantly less 
profitable in terms of return on assets (ROA, p<.01) and are more likely to be making a loss 
(LOSS, p<.01) than non-violating firms are. However, violating firms have significantly more 
(p<.01) tangible assets (TGA).  
In Panel B of Table 4, small-slack firms have a significantly (p<.01) lower level of 
PROPV. This difference indicates that small-slack firms have a significantly smaller amount of 
OBS operating leases than non-small-slack firms do. The mean difference in column (5) is          
-0.1406. We also find significant differences in other firm characteristics between the two 
groups. The small-slack firms are significantly larger (p<.01) in terms of market value of equity 
(LnMVE) and have significantly higher (p<.01) tangible asset ratios (TGA). These results suggest 
that to investigate the relationship between OBS operating leases and debt, we must control for 
variation in these confounding firm characteristics. Similarly, in Panel C of Table 4, we compare 
the firm characteristics of the high and low PVIOL groups. We use PVMD, the median value of 
PVIOL, to separate the sample firms into high and low PVIOL groups. 
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Table 5 presents the results of the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the model 
variables. We report Pearson correlations in the upper right diagonal and Spearman correlations 
in the lower-left diagonal. As hypothesized, PROPV has a significant negative (p<.01) 
relationship with VIOLATION and PVIOL. VIOLATION and PVIOL are also significantly 
correlated with the firm performance variables ROA (p<.01) and LOSS (p<.01).  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 6 reports the results of three model specifications to test whether firms with a high 
probability of violating their loan covenants will use operating leases less than firms with a low 
probability of covenant violation (H1a) and whether the availability of leases affects the results 
(H1b). Model (1) presents the results from the model specification with PVIOL, which measures 
the probability of covenant violation following loan inception, including the five control 
variables (LnMVE, MTB, TGA, LOSS, and ROA) and firm and year fixed effects. The adjusted-R2 
of Model (1) is 0.1781. The variable of interest, PVIOL has a coefficient of -0.0246 (p<.01), 
meaning that on average, the relative use of OBS leases (PROPV) decreases by 2.46% as PVIOL 
(the probability of violation) increases by 1. This result supports Hypothesis 1a; that is, firms 
with a high probability of violating debt covenants use operating leases significantly less than 
low-probability firms do. These high probability of violating firms use leases as a substitute for 
debt.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Model (1) also incorporates HighOBSL with an interaction term (PVIOL × HighOBSL) to 
test H1b related to high-lease industries. HighOBSL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm 
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belongs to an industry in which leasing is common; that is industries in the top 50 percent of the 
distribution using the present value of OBS leases divided by total assets, and 0 otherwise. 
In Model (1), the coefficient on the interaction variable PVIOL × HighOBSL is 0.0339 
and significant at the 0.05 level. This positive coefficient means that if a firm operates in an 
industry in which OBS leases are common, then as the probability of violation increases by 1, the 
relative use of OBS operating leases increases by 0.0093 (the sum of the two coefficients, 0.0339 
and -0.0246). This result supports H1b that firms with a high probability of covenant violation 
following loan inception in high-lease industries use OBS leases significantly more than low-
probability firms do, implying that these firms use leases as a complement to debt. This result is 
consistent with Eisfeldt and Rampini’s (2009) conclusion that “for more financially constrained 
agents, the benefit of the higher debt capacity of leased capital outweighs the costs due to the 
agency problem induced by the separation of ownership and control” (p. 1651).  
  Models (2) and (3) in Table 6 incorporate alternative measures for the probability of 
violation, PVMD, and LOGPVIOL. PVMD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s PVIOL is 
above the median PVIOL, and 0 otherwise. LOGPVIOL is the natural logarithm of PVIOL. The 
results from these alternative specifications are qualitatively consistent with those from Model 
(1). 
Table 7 presents the results of Models (4) and (5). Model (4) tests Hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
and Model (5) tests Hypotheses 3a and 3b. H2a and H2b relate to firms in violation of their debt 
covenants, and H3a and H3b relate to small-slack firms that are within 20% of debt covenant 
violation. Model (4) presents the results from equation (1) with the VIOLATION variable. The 
adjusted-R2 is 0.2128. The significant coefficient on VIOLATION is -0.0750 (-11.01, p< .01), 
meaning that on average, the relative use of OBS operating leases decreases by 7.50% for firms 
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that violated covenants. This result supports Hypothesis 2a that firms that violated their debt 
covenants use OBS leases significantly less than non-violating firms do, and thus treat leases as a 
substitute for debt.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
The interaction variable (VIOLATION × HighOBLS) represents the incremental effect of 
belong into an industry in which OBS leases are common on a firm’s use of operating leases 
when a firm violates covenants. The significant (p<.01) coefficient on VIOLATION × HighOBLS 
is -0.0663, meaning that the relative use of OBS operating leases decreases by 0.1413 (the sum 
of -0.0663 and -0.0750) as a firm violates its debt covenants if a firm is in a high lease industry. 
Therefore, the result supports Hypothesis 2b that firms in high lease industries that violated their 
debt covenants use OBS operating leases as a substitute for debt. 
Model (5) presents the results from the model to test H3a and H3b relating to small-slack 
firms that are within 20% of debt covenant violation. Model (5) incorporates the SMALLSLACK 
variable in equation (1). The adjusted-R2 is 0.1708. The coefficient on SMALLSALCK represents 
the effect of a small covenant slack on a firm’s relative use of operating leases. The significant 
(p<.01) coefficient on SMALLSLACK is -0.0715, which means that on average, the relative use 
of OBS operating leases decreases by 7.15% if a firm has small debt covenant slack. This result 
supports H3a that firms with small slack use OBS leases significantly less than firms that are not 
at risk of covenant violation. 
Model (5) also includes HighOBSL and an interaction term identifying firms with small 
slack in high lease industries (SMALLSLACK × HighOBLS) to test H3b. The coefficient of 
SMALLSLACK × HighOBLS is -0.0498 (p< 0.01), indicating that the use of OBS leases 
decreases further by 0.1213 (the sum of -0.0498 and -0.0715) for small slack firms in an industry 
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in which operating leases are common. This result supports Hypothesis 3b that firms in high-
leasing industries that are very close to violating their debt covenants use OBS operating leases 
significantly less than firms that are not at risk of violating their covenants do. These results are 
consistent with our findings for firms that are in violation of debt covenants; that is, firms that 
are close to debt covenant violation use leases as a substitute for debt, regardless of whether they 
are in an industry in which lease financing is common or not. This is in contrast to our findings 
that firms in high lease industries that are at risk of violation (i.e., the high ex-ante probability of 
violation) use leases as a complement to debt. This finding supports our argument that a 
covenant violation or the threat of a violation acts as the stimulus leading to changes in the use of 
OBS operating leases relative to long-term debt. The ex-ante probability of violation does not 
appear to invoke the same firm behavior8,9 
  
Additional Analyses 
To gain a fuller understanding of our results for firms in high-lease industries, we 
compare the characteristics of these firms to those of low-lease industry firms. As Panel A in 
Table 8 shows, high-lease industry firms have significantly lower market value and tangible 
assets than do firms in low lease industries (p<.01). In addition, there are significantly more 
firms running a loss in high-lease industries than in low-lease industries (p<.01). 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
8 We repeated our main analyses after including a Tax dummy variable equal to 1 if the net operating loss (NOL) 
carryforward is greater than zero and 0 if the NOL carryforward is zero. The results of the regressions with the Tax 
variable are qualitatively consistent to the results without the Tax variable reported in Tables 6 and 7.  
9 To address the potential endogeneity concern, we repeated our main analyses using the Heckman two-step 
estimation procedure. The results in Tables 6 and 7 are all qualitatively consistent. Specifically, the Inverse Mills 
Ratio in the Heckman estimation procedure is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1144, t-value = 1.58), 
suggesting that potential endogeneity is not a significant concern in our cross-sectional models. 
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 Further, these high-lease industry firms have significantly higher debt default spreads and 
significantly lower credit ratings (Panel B of Table 8). The variable Spread 1 denotes the default 
spreads that go with the “synthetic” credit ratings. Adding default spreads to the risk-free rate 
should yield the firm’s pre-tax cost of borrowing.10 We also use an additional measure of default 
spreads, Spread 2, based on the ranked order of a firm’s default spread. The analysis provides 
evidence of the low credit ratings of high-lease industry firms compared to firms with low leases. 
This result implies a higher debt cost for high-lease industry firms, which coupled with the 
availability of leases, may make asset leasing an attractive financing option for these firms.  
To understand our measure of covenant violation more thoroughly, in Table 9, we 
compare the measure of the probability of covenant violation (PVMD), the ex-ante measure of 
violation, to Violation, the actual measure of violations, for the overall sample (Panel A), and for 
firms in the high lease industry (Panel B). We use the PVMD indicator variable for this analysis, 
which equals 1 if a firm’s probability of violating its debt covenants (PVIOL) is above the 
median, and 0 otherwise. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
In Panel A of Table 9, for the overall sample, 35.62% of firms have debt covenant 
violations. For the high-lease industry firms, as in Panel B, 29.25% have debt covenant 
violations. Further, examining only the violating firms, Panel A of Table 9 reports that PVMD, 
the ex-ante measure, predicts that 64.56% of all violating firms would have debt covenant 
violations. This probability jumps to 73.43% for high-lease industry firms, as in Panel B. PVMD 
may identify firms with a higher debt cost. We believe this supports our results in Table 6. Firms 
with a high probability of covenant violation in high-lease industries use OBS leases as a 
 




complement to debt. The combination of high debt cost and the availability of a leasing market 
provides firms with incentives to seek out leasing as an additional source of financing beyond 
traditional debt.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research indicates that firms use OBS leases both as a substitute for and 
complement to debt. We investigate this paradox by examining the relationship between OBS 
leases and long-term debt by analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles measured by the constraints in 
the financial ratios included in their debt covenants. We identify a channel between leases and 
long-term debt. We measure firms’ risk profiles using the probability of covenant violation, 
covenant violations, and closeness to covenant violations in periods subsequent to loan inception. 
Our sample consists of firms that violated their debt covenants, are very close (within 20%) to 
debt covenant violation, and firms not at risk of covenant violation.  
Our results provide evidence that the use of leases is related to the availability of lease 
financing in a firm’s industry. In general, firms facing financial constraints; that is, a high 
probability of covenant violation, covenant violations, or close to covenant violations, use OBS 
operating leases significantly less than firms not facing these constraints do, indicating that firms 
use leases as a substitute (an alternative source of financing) for long-term debt. However, for 
firms operating in industries in which operating leases are common, firms with a high probability 
of covenant violation use OBS operating leases significantly more than firms without these 
constraints do. That is, these high-risk profile firms use leasing as a complement (an additional 
source of financing) to long-term debt. This finding provides further evidence that counter-party 
risk influences the relationship between debt and leases, as Ambrose et al. (2019) hypothesize.  
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Comparing these high-lease industry firms to low-lease industry firms shows that firms in 
industries with strong leasing markets have significantly lower market values, lower tangible 
assets, and higher debt default spreads than firms in industries in which leases are uncommon do, 
implying that these high-lease industry firms face higher traditional debt costs. In this case, when 
considering financing options, leases are an attractive option compared to traditional debt. 
However, once a firm triggers its debt covenants or is close to violating those covenants, leases 
are no longer an available option, acting as a substitute for debt. This result supports prior 
research that finds that managers act to avoid debt covenant violations (Dichev and Skinner, 
2002). 
The finding that firms operating in industries that actively use leases have a higher level 
of OBS leases when they have a higher probability of covenant violation provides additional 
evidence to the accounting and finance literature that documents the significant impact of moral 
hazard and incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors on their debt financing policy. 
Further, we empirically identify a specific channel (debt convents) for the debt financing and 
OBS-lease-financing link.  
Our results imply that firms facing financial constraints will attempt to lease more of their 
assets, but the availability of leasing is constrained by their debt covenant obligations and the 
strength of the leasing market in its industry. Overall, this evidence indicates that the debt market 
recognizes the impact of leasing on firms’ financial conditions, implying that the accounting 
recognition of lease liabilities required by the revised lease accounting standard (Accounting 




Our results are limited to the U.S. market with its institutional structure. In future studies, 
it would be interesting to perform a similar analysis of firms in other countries. Additionally, it 
would be helpful to investigate the relationship between operating leases and long-term debt by 
analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles after the full implementation of the revised leasing standard 




                         PVL = Present value of off-balance-sheet (OBS) operating leases 
                   PROPV = Present value of OBS operating leases divided by the sum of the present value 




                     PVIOL = Probability of covenant violation following loan inception, defined following 
Demerjian and Owens (2016) 
           VIOLATION = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm violates its debt covenants, and 0 
otherwise 
                     PVMD = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s PVIOL is above the median PVIOL, 
and 0 otherwise 
             LOGPVIOL = Natural logarithm of PVIOL 
        SMALLSLACK = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s debt covenant slack is less than 0.20 
and 0 if the slack is greater than 0.20 
              HighOBSL = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to an industry in the top 50% 
of the distribution using the present value of OBS operating leases divided by 
total assets, and 0 otherwise 
       INTERACTION = Interaction terms between VIOLATION, PVIOL, or SMALLSLACK and High 




                           TA = Total assets 
                           TL = Total liabilities 
                      LTDT = Long-term debt 
            LEVERAGE = Long-term debt divided by total assets 
                   LnMVE = Natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
                        MTB = Market-to-book ratio 
                        TGA = Tangible assets to total assets ratio 
                        ROA = Return on assets 
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